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I. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD AND RELATED CASES
A. The Bush Board
Over the past year, the National Labor Relations Board was subject to turnover
and vacancies; not until January 2006 did the Board again reach full strength. The full
Board still holds a Republican majority. The current members with their party affiliation
and term expiration dates, are:
Peter Schaumber (R)
Wilma Liebman (D)
Robert Battista (Chair)(R)
Dennis Walsh (D)
Peter N. Kirsanow (R)

Recess appointment; nominated to fill remainder of
a term that is set to end on August 27, 2010
8-27-06
12-16-07
Recess appointment, to extend through 2007 and
nominated to complete term set to end on 12-16-09.
Recess appointment, to extend through 2007 and
nominated to complete term set to end on 8-27-08

B. Yeshiva Watch: LeMoyne-Owen College
On September 30, 2005, the Board issued a decision in LeMoyne-Owen College,
345 NLRB No. 93 (2005), in which it found that the faculty members at that institution
were managerial employees and not covered by the Act. The Board found that the faculty
effectively controlled the curriculum, the courses of study and degree content, teaching
methods, grading, admissions standards and textbooks as well as accreditation reviews.
This case was on remand from the D. C. Circuit Court of Appeals, which had reversed
and remanded the original Board decision that had found the faculty not to be managers.
LeMoyne-Owen College v. NLRB, 357 F. 3d 55 (D.C. Cir., 2004) rev’d 338 NLRB No.
92 (2003) .
In the original case, the Regional Director had not found managerial status due to
several factors. First, the faculty standing committees and faculty assembly were not
necessarily comprised entirely of faculty. Second, recommendations from those bodies
were subject to multiple review levels, with the Regional Director explaining, “the more
levels of authority a recommendation must pass the less likely the recommendation will
be “effective,” because there is a lessened likelihood it will arrive at the top of the
hierarchy in substantially unchanged form.” Third, the president had circumvented the
standing committees by appointing individuals to special committees to study specific
topics, such as the core curriculum requirement.
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Upon remand from the Circuit Court, the Board this time found that the faculty
handbook gave substantial managerial power to the faculty in critical areas like
curriculum, courses of study, majors and minors, and even college organization among
other areas; that the assembly was comprised entirely of faculty except for the dean and
assistant dean; and that the recommendations from these bodies had been routinely
followed by the administration and trustees. The Board also cited examples such as the
faculty preventing the reorganization of the colleges’ divisions; the approval of a
childhood education major; and the effective recommendation to discontinue the graduate
program, among other curriculum decisions. The Board further found that virtually all
major faculty recommendations had been approved, despite the layers of review. As to
the ad hoc special committees, the Board found that they were also heavily represented
with faculty members and did not preclude further assembly review. The Board also
found effective faculty power in promotion and tenure recommendations, noting that all
recent faculty recommendations on tenure cases were approved by the Trustees. The
Board noted that the faculty has also effectively rewritten the evaluations procedures for
the college. In light of this record and the guidance of past precedent, the Board found the
faculty to be managerial and not subject to the protections of the Act.
Board member Liebman dissented, arguing that the Board majority relied on a
record that was “far too thin” to support managerial status. She pointed out that while the
faculty handbook does indeed grant great powers to the faculty on paper, there was little
evidence that the faculty ever exercised such authority. She tried to draw a distinction
between recommendations that are “routinely approved” and those, as here, that are
“independently reviewed” at higher levels. In the latter case, she would contend the
faculty’s recommendations are not “effective,” even if ultimately approved. Member
Liebman was also troubled by the fact that the dean would review major curriculum
initiatives even before the matter got to the faculty assembly, thus undercutting the
independence of the faculty. Further, the creation of special ad hoc committees with
some non-faculty representatives as part of them undercut faculty governance. In the end,
she concluded that faculty authority was only proven in the areas of content of courses,
grading and honors – an insufficient record to establish managerial status.
C. Work Place Rules: Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia
An important area of Board decisions over the years has been the tension between the
employer’s right to issue work place rules of conduct and the employees’ right to engage
in protected concerted activity under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.
In Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB No.75, 176 LRRM 1044
(2004), by a 3-2 vote, the Board held that work rules prohibiting abusive and profane
language, harassment, and verbal, mental and physical abuses were lawful ways of
maintaining order in the workplace and did not infringe upon protected concerted activity
by employees.
The core of the Board’s decision is set forth at the beginning of the decision:
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“The Board has held that an employer violates Section 8(a)(1) when it maintains a
work rule that reasonably tends to chill employees in the exercise of their Section
7 rights. Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB 824, 825 (1998). In determining
whether a challenged rule is unlawful, the Board must, however, give the rule a
reasonable reading. It must refrain from reading particular phrases in isolation,
and it must not presume improper interference with employee rights. Id. at 825,
827. Consistent with the foregoing, our inquiry into whether the maintenance of a
challenged rule is unlawful begins with the issue of whether the rule explicitly
restricts activities protected by Section 7. If it does, we will find the rule
unlawful. If the rule does not explicitly restrict activity protected by Section 7, the
violation is dependent upon a showing of one of the following: (1) employees
would reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule
was promulgated in response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to
restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights.”
In the year following Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, the Board also ruled in
Guardsmark, LLC, 344 NLRB 97 (2005) that an employer violated the Act by
maintaining a rule that prohibits its employees from complaining about their terms and
conditions of employment to the employer’s customers. However, the Board also found
that the employer did not violate the Act by maintaining a rule that forbids employees
from fraternizing with coemployees or with the employees of the employer’s customers.
Finally, in the same case, a rule prohibiting solicitation while on duty or in uniform was
struck down as illegal.
The employer in Guardsmark was a nationwide corporation providing uniformed
security personnel to commercial entities. The company maintained a set of work rules
for its employees which included the following three rules:
GENERAL ORDERS, paragraph 5: “While on duty you must follow the chain or
command and report only to your immediate supervisor. If you are not satisfied
with your supervisor’s response, you may request a meeting with your supervisor
and his or her supervisor. If you become dissatisfied with any other aspect of your
employment, you may write the Manager in Charge or any member of
management. Written complaints will be acknowledged by letter. All complaints
will receive prompt attention. Do not register complaints with any
representatives of the client.”
GENERAL ORDERS, paragraph 18: “Solicitation and distribution of literature
not pertaining to officially assigned duties is prohibited at all times while on duty
or in uniform, and any known or suspected violation of this order is to be
reported to your immediate supervisor.”
GENERAL ORDERS, paragraph 4: “While on duty you must NOT… fraternize
on duty or off duty, date or become overly friendly with the client’s employees or
with co-employees.”
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The Board analyzed these rules under the guidance of its previous rulings in Lutheran
Heritage Village and the earlier decision in Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB 824 (1998),
enfd 203 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The Board reiterated that it will first look to whether
or not the rule explicitly restricts Section 7 activity. If it does, it is illegal. If it does not,
then the Board will only find a violation upon a showing that 1) the employees would
reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity; 2) the rule was
promulgated in response to Section 7 activity or 3) the rule has been applied to restrict the
exercise of Section 7 activity.
In the case of the first general order dealing with workplace complaints, the Board
found that the restriction on complaining to representatives of the client, “explicitly
trenches upon the right of employees under Section 7 to enlist the support of the
employer’s client or customers regarding complaints about terms and conditions of
employment.” The employer argued that the rule applies exclusively to on-duty conduct
and is therefore a permissible regulation of employee conduct. The Board disagreed:
“By instructing employee to follow the chain of command “while on duty,” the
employer’s rule arguably limits its prohibition on lodging complaints with
employees outside the chain of command to working time only. However, its
prohibition on discussing terms of employment with customers is not similarly
time-limited. It is absolute – “do not register complains with any representatives
of the client.” ”
(One can speculate if there is a parallel here about faculty members soliciting students
and parents to support their bargaining positions, with a distinction being drawn between
soliciting students during class time versus outside of “working time.”)
The second rule on solicitation was easily disposed of by the Board. It found the
rule limited solicitation during non-working time, was overly broad and contrary to wellestablished principles on solicitation. The Board rejected the employer’s only
justification for the rule, namely, that allowing employees to engage in off-duty
solicitation while in uniform would leave the impression that the company was giving
unlawful assistance to a labor organization.
Regarding the fraternization rule, the employer was found not to have violated the
Act. This rule was upheld because employees could not reasonably read this rule to
prohibit protected employee communications about terms and conditions of employment.
An employee would reasonably read the rule to prohibit only “personal entanglements”
rather than activity protected by the Act.
In a case out of the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in Colorado, Double Eagle
Hotel & Casino, 414 F. 3d 1249 (10th Cir, 2005), the Court upheld a 2004 NLRB
decision that two casino rules--prohibiting the discussion of company or personal
problems anywhere around guests and prohibiting discussion of the tip sharing policy-were both unlawfully broad because they were not limited to areas frequented by
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customers. The appeals court also found that the casino’s rules on confidential
information and communication illegally interfered with the employees’ Section 7 rights.
The rules in question were:
“Never discuss Company issues, other employees and personal problems to or
around our guests. Be aware that having a conversation in public areas with
another employee will in all probability be overhead.”
The confidential information rule prohibited the dissemination of certain
information outside the employee’s department, including salaries, performance
evaluations, pay increases, etc. Employees are not, without prior approval,
“permitted to communicate any confidential or sensitive information concerning
the Company or any of its employees to any non-employee.”
The Court said that the rules were overly broad and not limited to areas frequented by
customers. Had it been so limited, it may have been upheld, but it could reasonably be
construed to cover areas which guest would not frequent. Further, a rule that interferes
with employees’ rights to discuss wages and other terms and conditions of employment
is illegal. While the employer does have an interest in protecting its confidential
information, the casino in this case defined confidential too broadly.
D. Solicitation Rules and Union Elections
In Enloe Medical Center, 345 NLRB No. 54 (2005), the Board found that.
the medical center violated the NLRA by: 1) requiring employees to remove or cover
pro-union badges in certain locations and 2) prohibiting the placement of union literature
in the break room. A unanimous Board panel of Battista, Schaumber and Liebman found
that employees were told they could not wear badges that said, “Ask me about our
union,” or “ask me about the SEIU” in immediate patient care areas. The memo from the
hospital administration went on to state that the employees either had to remove the
badges or cover the language on them while inside the hospital unless they were in areas
that patients, families and visitors did not frequent.
The Administrative Law Judge found that the badges did not constitute
solicitation and therefore the ban was inappropriate. Upon review, the Board believed
that the badges did constitute solicitation but still found a violation because the policy
was overly broad:
“… in requiring employees to limit their wearing of the badges in nonpatient care areas that patients, families and visitors do not frequent, the
rule set forth exceeded the restrictions that would be presumptively valid
under our law.”
Unless the hospital could show the broader rule was necessary to avoid disrupting
patient care, the policy would be deemed illegal. The hospital said the broader rule was
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necessary because of the inconvenience of putting on and taking off the badges
throughout the course of the day. The Board found such a justification insufficient.
In addition, the hospital had sent a memo out restricting the union from placing
literature in an employee break room. Such a memo was found to be discriminatory on its
face because it barred only union literature from being placed in the break room.
On the other hand, it was not illegal for a nurse manager to ask a couple of
employees who had accompanied her to a meeting why, “off the record,” they believed
they needed a union. The employees cited decreasing benefits, a feeling of distrust and
management issues. The meeting last 10 minutes. While noting that the employer
violates the Act when “interrogation reasonably tends to restrain, coerce or interfere with
rights guaranteed by the Act,” the Board found this interview non-coercive because the
employees were not reluctant to respond to the nurse manager’s question and no further
inquiries were made after the interview. Member Liebman dissented from this finding,
noting that the manager had no apparent reason for her question; did not assure the
employees that they did not have to answer her; did not assure them that a refusal to
answer would have no effect on their job; and that the questioning took place in a highlevel manager’s office during a disciplinary meeting.
In another 2-1 decision (Liebman dissenting), the Board found that the Aladdin
hotel and casino in Las Vegas did not violate the Act when two Human Resources
Managers interrupted employee conversations about union organizing and gave
management’s view of the matter. Aladdin Gaming LLC, 345 NLRB No 41 (2005)
In this case, two off-duty employees were at a table in the employee dining room talking
to one another about signing union cards. The VP of Human Resources came into the
room and stood by the table for approximately two minutes without speaking and then
interrupted the employees’ conversation and spoke for about eight minutes about the
company’s no-union position. Two days later an off-duty employee was soliciting
another off-duty employee to sign a card when another HR representative approached
them in the dining room and expressed management’s perspective on unionization.
In both cases, the Board found no violation. The presence of the managers in the
dining room was routine and their observation of employees engaging in solicitations was
not accompanied by any coercive action. Both managers had a right to express their
opinions about unionization, and although the employees may have stopped their own
solicitations to listen, the employees could have ignored him and continued their own
conversation. The Board said, “This is not a case where an employer representative lurks
in the background to surreptitiously hear the employees’ conversation. Rather, this is a
case where the representative openly stood by the employee table for two minutes until
he began to speak.” In contrast, Member Liebman found the conduct illegal, noting that
section 8(C) of the Act does not give employers “a license to effectively terminate a
conversation between employees” and that such conduct was coercive.
E. Illegal Promises, Threats and Union Elections
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In E.L.C. Electric, Inc., 344 NLRB No. 144 (2005), in a 2-1 decision, the Board
majority (Battista and Liebman) found that an employer’s comments before an
election that the company was actively seeking to improve its health benefits was an
unlawful promise of benefits. In this case, when the IBEW began organizing the
company, the company’s vice president or operations and the general superintendent
began visiting job sites to answer questions by employees about the union. In one
session, when an employee asked about whether the employer was trying to improve
health benefits, the vice president said the company was “actively seeking to improve
health benefits by the end of the year.” He made no promise that it actually would
take place.
However, the Board found that these comments constituted an “implied
promise” that the employees could reasonably interpret as being linked to voting
against the union. Dissenting member Schaumber disagreed, finding the comment
uncoercive, and indeed “an innocent casual remark.”
In another election case, a Board majority of Battista and Schaumber found that a
supervisor’s offer to discuss employee problems during the course of an organizing
campaign was not illegal. One supervisor asked an employee if she had any problems
or questions about the union and if she did, she should come and talk to him about it.
The supervisor also said that he would be willing to talk to other employees as well.
The Board said that supervisor’s question was a permissible question as to whether
the employee “had any uncertainties about union representation, election procedures
or the company’s views on the union.” It was not a solicitation of grievance or a
promise of benefits. Dissenting member Liebman found the employee could have
understood the discussion as “an implicit offer to redress her problems if she declined
to support the union.” [Contempora Fabrics, Inc., 344 NLRB No. 106 (2005)]
All members agreed, however, that the company acted unlawfully when it
required employees to attend a series of mandatory meeting about the campaign
where the vice president “unlawfully predicted that unionization would cause the
company to lose customers and risk plant closure.” The statements were made
without any objective evidence or any objective basis for them and therefore were
unlawful.
F. Supervisors’ Support for a Union
In 2004, the Board had issued a significant decision in Harborside Healthcare
Inc., 343 NLRB No. 100, 176 LRRM 1113 (2004), where the Board held in a 3-2
decision that the pro-union activities of a nursing home charge nurse who later was
found to be a supervisor amounted to objectionable conduct that interfered with the
holding of a fair representation election.
In that case, the Board set forth in detail the criteria it would use to decide
whether or not a supervisor’s pro-union activity would be sufficient to overturn an
election.
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“[W}e take this opportunity to restate the legal standard to be applied in cases
involving objections to an election based on supervisory prounion conduct.
“When asking whether supervisory prounion conduct upsets the requisite
laboratory conditions for a fair election, the Board looks to two factors.
“(1) Whether the supervisor’s prounion conduct reasonably tended to coerce
or interfere with the employees’ exercise of free choice in the election.
“This inquiry includes: (a) consideration of the nature and degree of
supervisory authority possessed by those who engage in the prounion
conduct; and (b) an examination of the nature, extent, and context of the
conduct in question.
“(2) Whether the conduct interfered with freedom of choice to the extent that
it materially affected the outcome of the election, based on factors such as (a)
the margin of victory in the election; (b) whether the conduct at issue was
widespread or isolated; (c) the timing of the conduct; (d) the extent to which
the conduct became known; and (e) the lingering effect of the conduct.”
In 2005, Harborside was applied in the case of Chinese Daily News, 344 NLRB No. 132
(2005). There, a department supervisor at a newspaper tainted a representation election
by distributing union authorization cards and watching the employees sign them.
Members Battista and Schaumber set aside the 2001 union election victory. (78-61 in
favor of the union.) The Board found that the conduct was objectionable under
Harborside even though Harborside came after the election and conduct in question. The
Board said that the supervisor’s active solicitation of employees for the union tainted “the
laboratory conditions necessary for a fair election.” There were no mitigating
circumstances in this case and the supervisor’s activity materially affected the outcome of
the election (at least eight employees had been solicited by the supervisor).
Dissenting Member Liebman believed the retroactive application of Harborside
was inappropriate; she would have applied the earlier Board test under Millsboro Nursing
& Rehabilitation Ctr, 327 NLRB 879 (1999), which had stated that authorization cards
obtained by a supervisor were lawful where the employer clearly communicated an antiunion message and where there was no evidence of reprisal, punishment or intimidation
by the supervisor.
G. Preemption
Since the time of our founding fathers, the fundamental tension in our
constitutional system resides in the relative power and authority of the federal
government and state governments. In the legal world, this issue often arises under the
heading of preemption – the principle that in some regulated areas of society Congress
through its legislative authority has preempted the field, and states cannot pass legislation
that does violence to that federal oversight.
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In the past year, a number of preemption issues have arisen in the labor law
sector. In Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v Lockyer, 2005 U.S. App LEXIS 19208 (9th
Cir, September, 2005), a three judge panel for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit found that a California state law which prohibited employers receiving more than
$10,000 in state funds from using any of those funds to “assist, promote or deter union
organizing” interfered with an employer’s right to free speech under Section 8 (c) of the
NLRA and was thus preempted by that Act. The Court wrote:
“Although cast nominally as an effort to ensure state neutrality, the California
statute, by discouraging employers from exercising their protected speech rights,
operates to significantly empower labor unions as against employers. In doing so,
the California statute runs roughshod over the delicate balance between labor
unions and employers as mandated by Congress through the National Labor
Relations Act.”
The statute in question (A.B.1889) established a state policy “not to interfere with an
employee’s choice about whether to join or to be represented by a labor union,” and
consequently the state should not be subsidizing campaigns either way. Thus, the law
prohibited all recipients of state grants and private employers that receive more than
$10,000 annually in state funds from using “any of those funds to assist, promote or deter
union organizing,” which was further defined as “any attempt by an employer to
influence the decision of its employees in this state or those of its subcontractors
regarding …. [w]hether to support or oppose a labor organization that represents or seeks
to represent those employees… or [w]hether to become a member of any labor
organization.” An employer who qualified under this language could not use state funds
for “any expense, including legal and consulting fees and salaries of supervisors and
employees, incurred for research for, or preparation, planning or coordination of, or
carrying out, an activity to assist, promote, or deter union organizing.” The employers
also would have been required to keep detailed records to show the funds have not been
used for improper purposes. The law further created a presumption that if state and
nonstate funds were commingled in any way, the state funds were used for an illegal
purpose.
Violations of the law would not merely involved loss of state funds but included
fines and treble damages and the employer could be sued by both the State and by private
taxpayers.
In this most recent ruling, the Court expanded on the principle of preemption in
striking down the statute:
“We conclude that the California statute, which is far from the neutral enactment
that the state attorney general and the unions contend it to be, significantly
undermines the speech rights of employers related to union organizing campaigns.
Under the guise of preserving state neutrality with respect to labor relations, it
directly conflicts with employers’ rights as granted by the Act....
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“By creating exacting compliance burdens, strict accounting requirements, the
threat of lawsuits, and onerous penalties, the statute chills employer speech on the
merits of unionism.”
This was actually the second time the Court had ruled on the legislation. In Chamber of
Commerce v. Lockyer, 364 F. 3d 1154 (9th Cir., 2004), the Court had previously ruled that
California’s “neutrality” legislation limited the free exchange of ideas and free speech
during a union campaign and was inconsistent with national labor policy as delineated in
the National Labor Relations Act. However, the AFL-CIO secured a reconsideration of
the case and the opinion was withdrawn.
On January 17, 2006, the Court did grant rehearing en banc in the case.
In another preemption case, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals struck down a
Milwaukee County ordinance that required contractors who supply services for the
elderly or disabled to sign “labor peace” agreements with unions seeking to organize their
workers. Milwaukee Association of Commerce v. Milwaukee County, (Case No. 05-1531)
(7th Cir, 2005).
The ordinance required that any employer that contracts with Milwaukee County
must provide upon request to union representatives with the names, addresses and
telephone numbers of its employees who devote any significant time to working on
county projects. The employer must also promise to make no false statements to
employees about the union and not to hold “captive audience” meetings with employees
to oppose the union organizing drive. Unions, in turn, would agree to no “economic
action” against an employer that complied with the ordinance. The ordinance was
designed, it was argued, to promote labor peace by reducing work stoppages.
The court found, however, a “spillover effect” on the contractors’ non-county
contracts and other employees. In some companies, it would be impossible to segregate
county work from non-county work or employees who work on county contract from
those who do not. The employer’s free speech rights under the NLRA would clearly be
compromised.
In addition, since the not-so-hidden effect of this law would be to encourage
unionization, the court also emphasized that the ordinance would likely increase work
stoppages rather than decrease them. Since strikes can be a consequence of failed
collective bargaining, the more unionization occurred, the greater the likelihood of
strikes. It was noted that it would have been more effective to simply preclude
unionization among county contractors if avoiding work stoppages was the true
motivation behind the ordinance.
Finally, on the preemption front, a battle is warming up in Maryland over the socalled Wal-Mart legislation. The law in question (Fair Share Health Care Fund Act)
requires very large employers to contribute a minimum percentage of wages for
employee health care coverage or pay the difference to a public health care fund. Only
employers with 10,000 employees would be affected, and such employers would have to
spend at least 6% of their payroll on health care costs, or else pay the difference into the
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state fund. Out of all employers covered, only Wal-Mart does not meet this 6%
threshold.
On February 7, 2006, the Retail Industry Leaders Association challenged the law
in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland claiming, among other arguments,
that the law was preempted by ERISA. The statute was characterized in the lawsuit
(Retail Industry Leaders Association, v. Fielder, Docket No. 06-316, D. Md.) as “an
unlawful intrusion on the comprehensive federal framework for the administration and
regulation of employee benefit plans” that Congress has laid out in ERISA.
The defenders of the legislation will apparently argue that the law is not
preempted because the state was seeking to regulate employers, not ERISA plans. The
law would not require employers to set up ERISA plans, and only requires the employer
to spend a certain amount of money on health care costs, and if they do not, they must
contribute to a state fund. On the other side of the argument, opponents will claim that the
statute “relates” to a benefit plan because the natural consequence of the legislation will
be for companies to modify their plans.
This challenge will be extremely important to watch over the next year or two; as
many as 30 states are considering similar legislation (BNA, Daily Labor Report, 2-2306). It calls into question not only issues of preemption but the broader social and
political question of whether it is the responsibility of employers to provide health
insurance. As one editorial said, “Employers don’t pay workers’ car insurance,
homeowners’ insurance or grocery bills. They shouldn’t be responsible for picking up
their health care tab either.” [Des Moines Register, cited in NLRB Watch
(www.nlrbwatch.com , issue 35).] Even the Washington Post called this legislation “a
legislative mugging masquerading as an act of benevolent social engineering.” NLRB
Watch, supra.
H. Time Off for Negotiations
In Ceridian Corp. v. NLRB, (D.C. Cir., Case No. 05-1041 and 04-1421; January 27,
2006) enf’d 343 NLRB No. 70 (2004), the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld an
NLRB ruling that a company’s refusal to meet with a union bargaining team during
nonworking hours and at the same time refusing to grant the employees on the union
team unpaid leave to attend bargaining during working hours was violation of the Act.
Ceridian is an information services company that provides a variety of employment
services to other companies. One of its divisions offers call in assistance, whereby its
consultants will provide advice to employees of customers on a wide range of subjects
including substance abuse and emotional well-being. In 2003,the Service Employees
International Union was certified as the representative of approximately 130 employees
at Ceridian’s call-in service center in Minnesota. The new union recruited six employees
to serve on the bargaining team, and at the first bargaining session, the union requested
that the employees be allowed to take unpaid leave time to attend the bargaining sessions
during the work day. The union said it would compensate the workers for their lost time.

https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss1/22
DOI: 10.58188/1941-8043.1040

12
12

DiGiovanni: Annual Legal Update

The Company refused and said that in order to attend, such employees would
have to take time from their accrued paid time pool in full day increments. After further
discussion, the Company said the employees could take ½ days from their pool of days
instead since the bargaining sessions were only going to be half day sessions. The
negotiator for the Company also insisted that all meetings be held during the work day.
As a result, some of the workers did not attend any of the subsequent bargaining sessions
and others attended sporadically.
After bargaining broke down, the union filed Section 8 (a) (1) and (5) charges
claiming that the company, by denying its employees unpaid time off to attend bargaining
sessions during the workday while simultaneously refusing to bargain during nonworking
time, violated the Act. The Board agreed and ordered the company to grant the employee
representatives unpaid leave to attend during working hours, or alternatively agree to
meetings during nonworking hours.
On appeal, the company contended that, because an employer is not required to
pay employees for time spent attending negotiations, and because the company saw no
meaningful distinction between not paying employees and requiring them to use their
earned time to attend, it was irrational for the Board to find a violation. The Board’s view
on appeal was that, even if an employer is not required to pay employees to attend
bargaining sessions, there is a meaningful distinction between refusing to pay employees
and requiring them to deplete their earned time to participate. The difference is the union
can compensate employees for attending if the employer does not pay but it cannot give
them more leave than the employer permits.
The Court agreed. It wrote:
“Ceridian’s policy significantly circumscribes the universe of employees who are
able to serve as bargaining representatives, and thus interferes with its employees’
choice of representatives. Employees who need their PDO [earned time] to
accommodate substantial family responsibilities, for example, would not be able
to serve. An employee who exhausted his annual PDO allotment on bargaining
meetings would have nothing left with which to meet his family responsibilities
because the union cannot give him additional time off.”
The Court also noted that the company could have minimized the impact of granting
unpaid time off by simply scheduling some of the bargaining sessions during nonworking
time. The Company offered no rationale for not doing this other than “intrusion into the
personal time” of the management team – an insufficient basis to justify its interference
with its employees’ choice of representatives.
I. Religious Institutions and the NLRA
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One case of consequence was decided by the Board in 2005 on the issue of
institutions with religious affiliation being subject to the Board’s jurisdiction: Carroll
College, Inc., 345 NLRB No. 17, 8/26/05).
As background, the U.S. Supreme Court held in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of
Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) that the NLRB could not exercise jurisdiction over lay
teachers in church-operated schools, with the Court explaining that the Board could not
assert jurisdiction if it would create a “significant risk” to the free exercise of religion for
that institution.
In addition, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)
which said that government may not “substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability” unless the government can
show a compelling governmental interest and that it is the least restrictive means of
furthering that interest. While the RFRA was deemed unconstitutional as applied to state
and local government action, the Supreme Court has not yet resolved doubt about the
law’s constitutionality with regard to federal government action.
In 2002, in a case of great significance for institutions with religious affiliations,
the D.C Circuit Court of Appeals issued its ruling in University of Great Falls v. National
Labor Relations Board, 278 F. 3d 1335 ( D.C. Cir. 2002). In Great Falls, the D.C. Circuit
decided that the Board could not exercise jurisdiction based on a new test to determine
whether or not a college or university is a “religious institution” and therefore and
therefore beyond the jurisdictional reach of the National Labor Relations Board.
In Great Falls, the institution claimed both that it was exempt from the NLRA
and that application of the Act would violate the RFRA. The Circuit Court, in reversing
the Board, held that an employer does not have to show a “substantial burden” on the
employer’s exercise of religion. Instead, the employer has to meet the tripartite test
that would be met if it “(a) ‘holds itself out to students, faculty and community’ as
providing a religious educational environment . . . ; (b) is organized as a ‘nonprofit’ . . . ;
and (c) is affiliated with, or owned, operated, or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a
recognized religious organization, or with an entity, membership of which is determined,
at last in part, with reference to religion.”
Significantly, the Court also ruled that, even if an institution is not exempt from
the coverage of the Act, it may still raise an RFRA issue and argue that assertion of
jurisdiction would create a “substantial burden” on the exercise of religion.
Carroll College, Inc., is a private liberal arts college located in Waukesha,
Wisconsin, and affiliated with the Presbyterian Church. Faculty members had voted in
the United Auto Workers as their representative in a Board election and the college
challenged Board jurisdiction. In Carroll College, Inc., supra, the college conceded it
was an “employer” as defined in the NLRA but nonetheless contended that the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act would be violated if it were subject to the NLRA. The Board,
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in a 3-0 decision, ruled that applying the National Labor Relations Act to the college
would not violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
In reaching this result, the Board wrote that the college presented no evidence to
indicate what the tenets of the Presbyterian faith were or “how requiring it to bargain
collectively with the United Auto Workers would conflict with those tenets and hence
result in a substantial burden on its free exercise of religion.” Among the facts cited
were:
 the church has no administrative control over the college
 members of the Board of Trustees are not required to be members of the
church
 the college’s articles of incorporation prohibit limiting admission of students,
election of trustees and appointment of faculty members to Presbyterians
 faculty are not required to subscribe to the Christian faith or to teach or
promote the goals or values of the Church or Christianity in general
 students are not required to attend religious services
 church exercises no control over curriculum
On the other hand, the College’s mission statement includes a clause that states:
“we will demonstrate Christian values by our example.” The College also adopted a
Statement of Christian Purpose that provides in part:
“The Christian purpose of Carroll College is summarized in its motto “Christo et
Litteris” – for Christ and Learning. By means of a faculty dedicated to the
Christian purpose and assured of the academic freedom necessary to the
performance of its tasks, the college seeks to provide a learning community
devoted to academic excellence and congenial with Christian witness. To this
learning community, the college welcomes all inquirers.”
The Board found that the college did not carry its burden of proving that the
application of the Act would substantially burden its free exercise of religion.
The college had argued that collective bargaining would interfere with it right to
decide whether faculty members were satisfactorily conforming to the Protestant
theological tradition and the tenets of the “reformed” Presbyterian Church. The Board
disagreed, noting that there was nothing in the record to indicate that the college used any
religious criteria in its hiring process or decisions, or that faculty members must agree to
any statement of beliefs. There was no record of anyone ever being disciplined or
otherwise the recipient of an adverse employment decision for engaging in conduct
contrary to the teachings of the Church.
More importantly, the Board noted, such arguments are speculative. The only burden
on the college at present is the duty to bargain in good faith. To the extent the college
argues that that burden alone violates the RFRA, the Board rejected such a claim. This is
especially so since the college “did not offer a single piece of evidence to indicate what
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the tenets of the Presbyterian faith are and how requiring it to collectively bargain with
the Petitioner would conflict with those tenets and hence create a “substantial burden” on
its free exercise of religion.” Nothing in the Presbyterian faith, unlike other faiths such
as the Seventh Day Adventist faith, would prohibit collective bargaining or union
membership.
J. Management Rights Clauses and Arbitral Deferral
In Smurfit-Stone Container Corp., 344 NLRB No. 82 (2005), the Board held that
an administrative law judge of the NLRB should have deferred to an arbitrator’s decision
involving management rights clause and the right to unilaterally promulgate an
attendance policy.
The company’s hourly workers at its container facility had been represented by
the IBEW since the 1970s. In earlier years, the company had unilaterally implemented
no-fault attendance policies that did not excuse medical absences. It later modified that
policy to excuse absences when an employee obtained a doctor’s note. In 2000, the
company notified the union is was going to issue a new policy the following month that
would have no provision for excusing medical absences. While the parties met and
discussed the plan, the company refused to engage in bargaining, claiming it had the
unilateral right to issue the policy.
The Union filed unfair labor practice charges; the Board deferred the matter to
arbitration under Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837 (1971).
The arbitrator found in favor of the company but the administrative law judge
refused to defer to the award, concluding that the issues considered by the arbitrator were
not parallel to the unfair labor practice charge and that his award was clearly repugnant to
the Act. She then went on to find the employer guilty of an 8 (a) (5) refusal to bargain.
The Board reversed the judge. Using the standards set forth in Spielberg Mfg. Co.,
112 NLRB 1080 (1955), the Board first found that the arbitrations proceedings were fair
and regular. The Board then found that the arbitrator considered the ULP issue:
“The statutory issue here is whether the Respondent’s adoption of the new
absence control policy constituted a unilateral change. The question of whether or
not the management rights clause of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement
authorized the Respondent’s implementation of the new policy is determinative of
the unfair labor practice allegation here. 1 Further, that was the precise argument
the Respondent presented to the arbitrator, i.e. that its actions were privileged
under [the management rights article]. …. Contrary to the judge and our
dissenting colleague, we find a reasonable interpretation of the arbitrator’s
1

The management rights clause read: “the parties recognize that the operation of the plant and the direction
of the work force herein is the sole responsibility of the Company. Such responsibility includes, among
other things, the full right to assign work, to discharge, discipline, or suspend for just cause, and the right to
hire, transfer, promote, demote, or layoff employees because of lack of work or other legitimate reasons.”
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decision is that the management rights article authorized the implementation of
the absentee control policy… Indeed, the arbitrator concluded that the agreement
gave the Respondent the right to make rules as long as they did not conflict with
any provision of the agreement. He found no such conflict. Accordingly, we find
that the arbitrator adequately considered the relevant unfair labor practice issue.
Finally, the Board found that the arbitrator’s award was not clearly repugnant to the
purposes and policies of the Act. The standard for such a review is “whether [an arbitral
decision] is susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the Act, “ citing Olin Corp.,
268 NLRB 573 (1984) On this issue, the Board concluded that the decision “is
susceptible to the interpretation that relied upon the management rights clause and is not
dependent on an inherent management prerogative theory. As such, it is not clearly
repugnant to the Act.”2
Dissenting Board Member Liebman contended that the award was repugnant
because it did rely on some general theory of retained management rights and did not
focus on the specific management rights clause. But even if the award can be read as an
interpretation of the management rights clause, the Board should still not defer in
Member Liebman’s opinion. As she noted, “the clause makes no reference to attendance
or to the employer’s right to establish rules or policies of any sort, nor does the clause
assert that management retains the authority to act unilaterally except as limited by the
parties’ agreement.”
K. Retiree Health Benefits
One of the most controversial issues in labor relations today is whether or not
management will have the right to reduce or eliminate health insurance or other
benefits for retirees who were formerly covered by a collective bargaining agreement.
Usually, these issues focus on the particular issue of entitlement to the health
insurance plan offered to active employees or the special Medicare supplemental
plans that some employers will offer to retirees once they are 65 years of age. While
these cases come up in an endless variety of circumstances, one case decided last
December focuses on many of the common concerns litigants face in these situations.
In Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. Arvinmeritor,
Inc, Rockwell Automation, Inc, and Rockwell International, Case No. 03-73872 and
04-73656, E.D. Mich. (December 22, 2005), the Court issued an order granting a
preliminary injunction in favor of the Union and a class of retirees, to prevent the
company’s planned elimination all health benefits for retirees and their dependents
age 65 or over. The retirees had formerly worked at the plant represented by the
Union and retired under various collective bargaining agreements in past years. The
Union and retirees claimed the company did not have the right to eliminate those
health insurance benefits, arguing that they are lifetime benefits which individually

2

The Board noted that, had the arbitrator merely relied on some general theory of inherent management
prerogatives, the award may have been found to be repugnant to the Act.
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vested at the time of each retiree’s retirement. The company claimed that it had the
right to eliminate the benefits.
The relevant collective bargaining agreements had various clauses dealing with
retiree benefits including one that stated: “Hospital, Surgical and Medical Expense
Insurance. Upon retirement under the Pension Plan these coverages will be
continued during your retirement for yourself and for the eligible dependents who
were covered under this plan at the time of your retirement.” Another clause stated:
“The Health Care coverage an employee has under this article at the time of
retirement shall be continued thereafter provided that suitable arrangements for
continuation can be made with the carrier.” The Union argued that such language
constituted enforceable contractual promises of lifetime retiree health benefits to
accompany lifetime pension benefits. Among other evidence, the Union also
introduced numerous letters and statements from the company that constituted written
admissions that contractual health benefits begin at retirement and are intended to
continue thereafter, i.e. for the lifetime of the retiree.
The company argued principally that the labor agreements “clearly and
unambiguously” limited retiree benefits “ to the duration of the agreements creating
them.” The company relied on the agreements’ general duration clauses and other
examples of changes made by the company unilaterally over previous years to such
plans.
In granting the injunction, the Court found that the plaintiffs were likely to
succeed at trial. The Court turned to the principles that the 6th Circuit had used in
UAW v. Yard Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir., 1983), namely that retiree benefits
are in the nature of “status” benefits which “carry with them an inference that they
continue so long as the prerequisite status [retirement] is maintained.” The Court is to
apply basic contract principles in analyzing whether certain retiree benefits can be
altered or eliminated after the person has retired. Under this approach, the Court first
found that “the explicit language of the agreements ties retiree health benefits to
pension status and specifically promises, without time limitation, that the health
benefits ‘at the time of retirement… shall be continued thereafter’ for the duration of
the retirement.” This explicit language is bolstered by “context” evidence showing
that the company had represented by written assurances that these were indeed
lifetime benefits.
As to the defendant’s argument that the durational clause limited those benefits to
the particular life of the collective bargaining agreement, the Court disagreed. First,
general duration clauses do not override specific promises within the agreement of
lifetime benefits. As to the defendant’s argument that it had made changes in the past
to such plans, the Court noted that four of the seven changes are still under challenge,
one was agreed to by the Union and the others merely altered the mechanisms for
buying drugs and resulted in savings for the retirees.
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If nothing else, this case highlights again the importance of the specific contract
language surrounding benefits of any kind, especially retiree benefits. Lifetime
benefits will not be assumed in all cases, but clauses in collective bargaining
agreements that specifically or implicitly suggest that benefits are without time limit
are likely to be construed in such manner. On the other hand, the absence of such
guarantees shifts the burden to the retirees and the unions to show intent to provide
lifetime benefits.
L. Voter Lists
In George Washington University, 346 NLRB No. 13 (2005), the Board
unanimously found that the University’s omission of certain part-time faculty from a
voting list was not a factor that the employer could rely upon to justify setting aside
an election, stating that “where a party through its own error prevents an eligible
employee from voting, only the other, non-acting party has any foundation for an
objection,” a type of “clean hands” concept. In this case, the SEIU won an election
among adjunct faculty by a vote of 326-316 but there were 50 challenged ballots.
When some of the ballots were opened, the revised count still favored the union by a
new vote of 341-331. The University argued that by overruling challenges to two
particular faculty members who were not placed on the Excelsior List by the
University the Board effectively expanded the scope of the unit to include 20-30
similarly situated individuals. These individuals were suppliers--not directly
employed by the University--who provided teaching services to the institution
through a supply contract with a third party vendor. The University’s argument was
rejected, the union was certified and the University refused to bargain. The case is
now on appeal to the D.C. Circuit.
M. Parking fees
It was once said that the definition of “faculty” is “a group of professionals united
around a common grievance over parking.” While many issues seem weightier at the
bargaining table, parking policies, regulations and fees are often difficult subjects for
bargainers in higher education. In Illinois however, it will be less of a problem.
In University of Illinois v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 359 Ill.
App. 3d 1116 (2005), the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District found that
the issues of parking fees was not a mandatory subject of bargaining with a union
representing building service and food service workers. In this case, during
negotiations for a new contract, the union had proposed new parking rates for its
members. Under the fee system in place, first shift employees had been paying $375
per year and second shift workers $75. The union proposed that the rate be lowered to
$50 a year for first shift workers and $25 for second and third shift, plus free parking
between 2 am and 6 am. Even though the union was flexible on its proposal, the
University refused to discuss the issue of parking fees at all. Among other things, the
University argued that the parking fee structure was closely linked to its master plan
for parking lots on campus. The University noted that, since the state does not pay for
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parking lots, in order to finance new parking, long term revenue bonds are issued. To
issue these bonds, the University must project the revenue from the parking facilities
and demonstrate that the revenue will cover the debt service on the bonds. The need
to increase fees for parking is often linked to the need to construct new parking
facilities.
Under the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act, educational employers are not
“required to bargain over matters of inherent managerial policy” but must bargain
collectively “with regard to policy matters directly affecting… terms and conditions
of employment.” (115 ILCS 5/4 West 2000). The Supreme Court of Illinois set forth a
test under this statute. First, a determination must be made whether the matter
concerns “terms and conditions of employment.” If it does not, there is no duty to
bargain. If it does, the next question is whether it is a matter of inherent managerial
policy. If it is not, the subject must be bargained. But if it is, the next step is to
“balance the benefits that bargaining will have on the decision-making process with
the burdens that bargaining imposes on the employer’s authority.” [Central City
Educational Ass’n v. Illinois ELRB, 147 Ill. 2d 496, 599 N.E. 2d 892, 905 (1992)]
On the first question, the University argued that, since alternative parking is
available to its employees, an increase in parking fees is not a term or condition of
employment. Citing various precedent from within and outside Illinois, the Court
found this unpersuasive. Parking fees were clearly a term or condition of employment
in the Court’s eyes.
On the second question, neither party challenged the fact that the increase in fees
is a matter of “inherent managerial authority,” so the Court proceeded to the third
question, the balancing issue. Here, the Court found that the burden of bargaining
outweighed the benefits:
“On one side of the scale is the University’s master plan and the parking
component of that plan. On the other side are the employees, whose
livelihood and workplace are directly affected by the costs of parking, so
that they may work at and for the benefit of themselves and the University.
We conclude the evidence shows parking and the use of parking lots for
land planning are integral to the success of the University’s mission.
Locations and proximity of parking lots, the cost of parking, and the
potential long-term use of land acquired for parking are part of the
University’s managerial authority. The need for the University to control
these issues cannot be overcome by vague fee proposals that the Union
believes would satisfy the employer…. Better, cheaper parking would be a
benefit to employees. However, mandatory bargaining of this issue would
be a significant burden on the University and the authority of the
University to perform its mission.”
Accordingly, the Court found no duty to bargain the parking fees issue.
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II.

SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELATED MATTERS

In 2003, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decision Goodridge v.
Dept. of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309 (2003), held that the benefits, obligations and
responsibilities of civil marriage must also apply to same-sex couples. The Court thus
found that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts violated the Massachusetts Constitution
when it refused to grant marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Since May 17, 2004,
same-sex couples can lawfully marry in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
Over the past year there has been some further litigation in the state courts on
same-sex marriage and decisions are pending in some states. The organization Lambda
Legal has an excellent summary of national activity in this area on their web site.
www.lambdalegal.org.
A few recent cases involving the question of same-sex marriage include:
California: Woo v. Lockyer. (App. Div. Case no. A110449 et al) Matter on
appeal in State Appellate Division. In March 2005, the trial court ruled that samesex couples should be allowed to marry.
Iowa: Varnum v Brian. Case filed in December 2005 seeking same-sex marriage
rights.
New Jersey: Lewis v. Harris 2003 WL 23191114 (denied same-sex marriage as
guaranteed in New Jersey constitution.) On appeal, the NJ Appellate Court ruled
2-1 affirming the decision to deny same-sex marriage. The case was then brought
to the New Jersey Supreme Court. Oral argument in the case was heard on
February 15, 2006 and the parties are awaiting decision.
New York: Hernandez v. Robles, NY Slip Opinion 25057 (Feb.4, 2005)
(violation of NY constitution to deny same sex couples the right to marry.) In
December 2005, the Appellate Division reversed this decision and ruled that there
was no violation of the NY constitution. That decision has now been appealed to
the New York Appeals Court; briefs have just been filed.
Washington: Two trial-level courts have ruled that Washington’s Defense of
Marriage Act violates the state constitution. Anderson v. King County, 2004 WL
1738447 (Wash. Super.) August 4, 2004) and Castle v. State, 2004 WL 1985215
(Wash. Super.) September 7, 2004). Cases on appeal to state Supreme Court. Oral
argument was heard in March of 2005 and the matter is still awaiting decision.
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